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Abstract
Software project failure has directly and indirectly
cost trillions of dollars over the past fifty years. The
reasons for failure are many. Recently, we began
investigating methods for software project forensic
analysis in order to develop principles and practices
that would enable better understanding why, when,
where, how, and what causes software project failure.
This paper examines some of the issues and challenges
in performing forensic analysis of failing or failed
software projects. We propose an initial model based
on this first analysis to assist in critically evaluating
potential causes and assessing the potential for failure.
1. Introduction
The bad news is: Software Projects Fail! But there
is good news! We can determine why they are
failing/fail and we can specify methods to mitigate or
recover from the failure state. The reasons software
projects fail are well described. [1], [2], [3] Many
experts and bloggers have enumerated the reasons for
failure. Despite the many prescriptions for conducting
successful software projects, such as Capers Jones
publications, people find interesting ways to achieve
failure or fail to deliver on the original promise for
their software projects. As Capers Jones notes, ‘There
are many ways to make large software systems fail.
There are only a few ways of making them succeed’
[4]. Bryson and Bromily [5] identified potential
project success factors and found that most successful
projects had all of the success factors; and that the
success factors are interrelated.
The process of mitigating and recovering from
actual or pending software project failure has not been
adequately analyzed and researched. This paper
focuses on issues and challenges in recognizing,
analyzing, and recovering from actual or impending
failure in software projects. Our prescriptions are not
guarantees, but suggest analysis, remediation, and
recovery procedures that project managers can apply
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to back away from the precipice of failure and take
positive action with the intent of delivering useful
software to the target users.
One important Caveat: forensic analysis for failed
software projects overlaps with digital forensics for
cybersecurity, and may share some techniques.
However, this research addresses the broader subject
– the entire software development lifecycle and
utilizes several variables absent from existing
cybersecurity analytical frameworks.
2. Motivation
Why is it important to understand why software
projects fail and how to recover from impending
failure? Krigsman [6] has noted that the worldwide
cost of software project failure is in the trillions of
dollars. This is more than the GDP of all but a few
nations. As large software projects become more
prevalent, they become more costly due to the
complex requirements, architecture, and design
needed to meet their scale in a modern cloud-based
world.
Determining why software projects are failing and
then, applying remediation and recovery processes can
mitigate the compounding effect of failing causes. We
identify issues and challenges that directly address the
causes of failure and reduce project risk. We believe it
is a first step to assist project managers and researchers
in understanding the mechanism for software project
recovery.
One example of a massive software project that
seemed to always teeter on the brink of failure was the
Federal Aviation Administration’s Advanced
Automation System (AAS) [7]. This project, begun in
1981, was intended to provide a complete overhaul of
the nation's major air traffic control computer systems.
It would provide new tools and displays for controllers
to improved communication equipment and a
revamped core computer network to modernize U.S.
airspace through new technology to make flying safer,
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more efficient, and more predictable. Numerous
delays and challenges arose that caused FAA to revise
its budget projections, functionality, and completion
date over its lifetime until 1994 when it was canceled.
Of $2.6 billion spent less than half of the technology
was usable in follow-on projects. This project was
affected by many problems. Some of the problems,
initially identified by GAO [7], necessitated AAS
redesign several times. After this failure, the FAA
began a new project - the Next Generation Project,
with the same goals. It is composed of smaller
projects, but seems prone to some of the same
problems that affected the AAS.
3. Technical Approach
Our technical approach to providing guidance on
research and application of recovery procedures will
answer two research questions and provide an initial
model for further research:
(1) What are some key issues and challenges for
employing forensic analysis techniques to investigate
failing software projects based on the current project
failure literature; and
(2) What are some primary issues and challenges in
attempting to recover from software project failure;
and
(3) Propose an initial model to detect and assess causes
of pending project failure.
This paper assumes that stakeholders (executives,
managers, staff, etc.) recognize that a software project
is failing or that failure appears imminent.
Recognizing that a software project is failing and
admitting that it is failing – to oneself, the
development team, the stakeholders, and to the
executive sponsors - is a critical step in recovery. Once
this recognition of (impending) failure has been
achieved (or perhaps admitted), the first step is to
perform a forensic analysis of the software project to
determine the HOW and the WHY it is failing.
To determine whether recovery is possible, must
gather information and analyze it to discover why a
project is failing or has failed. From this analysis, the
team can determine whether (a) to attempt project
recovery – partially or wholly, or (b) permit it to fail
and decide whether or not to try again. This process
also provides the opportunity to identify potential
recovery procedures and examine the issues and
challenges of applying them to effect project recovery.
The remainder of this paper is organized into five
sections. Section 4 provides a definition of Forensic
Analysis. Section 5 addresses our primary research
questions. Section 6 presents our initial model for

detecting and assessing potential causes of failure.
Section 7 presents our conclusions and section 8
discusses future work.
4. Forensic Analysis – A Definition
Forensic Analysis is “the use of scientifically
derived and proven methods to preserve, collect,
validate, identify, analyze, interpret, and document the
evidence derived from digital and other sources for the
purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction
of events leading to the (impending) failure of a
(software) project” [8].
We have coined the term “Project Autopsy” to
mean the application of forensic analysis principles
and procedures to determining the how and the why a
project has failed. Analogous to medical autopsy, we
looked to other fields such as law enforcement,
forensic pathology, and military battle damage
assessment for digital forensic methods to develop a
framework for software project forensic analysis. This
framework yielded questions that must be asked and
data that must be gathered to discover processes,
events and patterns of decision-making in software
project management that lead to software project
failure. This approach addresses a software project
failure as an event that can (perhaps) be avoided and
not as a foregone conclusion as a number of
researchers have noted. [9] [10] [11]
A project can be in failure mode, but continue to
operate (spend more, consume resources, revise plans
and schedules, and produce reports). Without any
recovery procedures being implemented, management
will have to make a critical determination of future
activities. Resource allocation decisions made in
multi-project environments can be revised, and
implemented as part of a broader strategy that may
allow (intentionally or unintentionally) one project to
fail thereby releasing needed resources to other
projects [12]. This is similar to firefighters making the
difficult but often necessary decision to allow one
home to burn while focusing on saving the
neighboring homes.
Many decisions, if detected during project
execution, can signal a pending failure. These
decisions do not necessarily occur at the beginning of
a project, but can occur at any time during the project.
A project that seems to be succeeding in the early
stages, but then appears to enter a pending failure
mode is best supported through periodic forensic
analysis. This predictive element, which may not
produce any result leading to a healthy, successful

Page 961

delivery, is an investment that should be made to
detect pending failure as early as possible.
5. Employing Forensic Analysis: Challenges
Forensic analysis requires four essential tasks: (1)
observe: gather as much of the relevant data about the
project possible within reasonable time constraints; (2)
measure: analyze the data to determine where
problems arose and the impact of decisions
contributing to failure, (3) plan an incremental
approach allowing for feedback to drive adaptations
over time and then (4) act on that plan. Throughout
these tasks, the recovery team needs to provide
continuous reporting on why a project is failing or in
failure mode and formulating what can be done about
it. The details of the final task, act, depend on a
commitment by an organization’s executive
management that either the project is recoverable and
actions will be taken to recover it or the project will be
abandoned. We address the first three items in this
paper. Cohen, Kaisler, and Money [8] addressed the
last item in their HICSS-53 tutorial.
5.1. Analytic Techniques
Forensic analysis applies analytical processes to
project data to understand why a project is failing or
has failed. A large and enduring set of literature
documents the many software projects that have ended
in failures and the impacts of these outcomes. The
literature suggests that there are many issues and
challenges in performing forensic analysis on the
projects. Many of the failures have yielded lessons
learned through post-mortem analysis [13]. Many
other software projects are failing now but could be in
recovery if forensic analytic techniques were known
and applied to them. [14] [15] [16]
The techniques that previously have been applied
to analyze the state of a project (on a very basic
success – failure continuum) are many. They include;
system and outcome-based key performance
indicators (KPIs), process and product quality metrics
such as completeness and code quality (that lead to
technical deficiency), human dynamics preventing
team stress, communications blocks preventing clear
messaging, and poor management practices such as
failures to properly identify workloads and staff
project activities [17]. It is noted that the techniques
are not applied in total to any one software project
although all may have some value and contribute to an
understanding of the reasons for the failure.

5.2 Observe the Causes
To understand why a software project is failing or
has failed, it is critical to understand the root causes of
failure. Few failing/failed projects have a single cause.
Rather, there may be many root causes, including the
complexity of the project, its architecture, its
management structure, and the critical skills possessed
by multiple individuals on the project. Root causes
may also have interdependencies in complex projects.
Thus, root cause analysis is not a single method, but a
suite of methods that one can choose from to identify
and focus attention on root causes. Table 1 identifies
some issues in causal analysis.
Table 1. Causal Analysis

Stakeholders: Are the stakeholders’ goals, dynamics –
interpersonal and organizational, - and requirements
understood? Whose success is most critical (in rank
order)?
Dependencies: Is there a coherent model of
dependencies? For people? For technology? For business
processes? For required vs. optional data? [17]
Use of tools: What tools can be used to facilitate causal
analysis? Are they accessible to the analysis team?
Key Skills: What essential skills are required to conduct a
reliable forensic analysis that is defensible and
explainable?
Management: Does (did) the project leadership have the
right management skills – based on experience and
training – to conduct a successful project?
Technology: Did the development team(s) have the right
knowledge, training, and experience to execute the
project?

Like other domains, forensic analysis of failing
software projects requires specialized skills beyond
routine analysis and design skills. A current challenge
is to identify and describe those skills and develop the
educational and training programs to create a cadre of
forensic analysts.
In other domains, forensic analysis is performed
by a third party or independent internal team not
previously associated with the project. This team
performs the three essential tasks of forensic analysis.
If the management decision is to conduct recovery
operations, an assessment of the development team is
necessary to determine if they can perform a recovery
operation.
An apparent reason for the failure of AAS as cited
by the GAO [7] was the lack of “adequate oversight”
of IBM’s performance on development activities. The
FAA did not appear to have appropriate project
management expertise for a project of AAS’s
magnitude and complexity.
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5.3 Measure and Assess Causes and Effects
It is essential to identify where impediments exist
within a project or the organization sponsoring the
project that are preventing or degrading progress. A
barrier, which may be technological, financial, or
behavioral, constrains effective decision-making or
functional implementation. As an example, financial
problems may mean that a skilled worker cannot be
hired in a timely manner.
Systems/software engineering (SSE) and project
management (PM) practices have a socio-politicaltechnical nature that doesn't fit well with most of the
highly formalized theories of mathematics and
science. The latter can be predictive because they are
based on well-known universal and timeless
assumptions. But SSE and PM involve people and
shifting factors that need to be periodically re-oriented
and re-evaluated to understand how they affect success
[18]. Table 2 identifies some challenges associated
with measuring cause and effect.

Paraphrasing Rechtin [20], functionality, cost and
schedule cannot be specified independently. At least
two of these three must depend on the others. We have
suggested some simple metrics as early warning signs
which are cost overruns, schedule slippage, labor hour
overruns, and lack of functionality in [8]. We chose to
separate costs into labor costs and other costs in our
model (Figure 1). These factors are proposed as the
determinants for potential failure in our model
described in section 6.
At the beginning of the project, project
management needs to choose a time unit to calculate
changes in these factors. For each of these factors, the
delta change at succeeding times may be zero, a
constant increase or decrease, or an accelerating
increase. Costs will continue to increase as the project
continues. Schedule may increase due to slippage.
Functionality can increase or decrease for several
reasons. Table 3 addresses other challenges associated
with risk analysis.

Table 2. Effect Measurement: Issues and Challenges

Table 3. Risk Issues

5.4 Risk Analysis
A risk factor is an event that may happen that may
cause project failure. Failure is not guaranteed if the
event occurs. The severity of the event can affect the
likelihood of project failure. Some organizations begin
new complex projects without ever having completed
a project with similar characteristics – size,
technology, complexity, and schedule. Every new
project is a learning opportunity but is also an
opportunity to fail to apply lessons learned from
previous projects.

Complexity arises from several factors – among
them requirements creep and impact on system
architecture, amount of attempted functionality
delivery, and interdependencies among system
components. As complexity increases in a
system/project, nonlinear effects are likely to
predominate. Modeling non-linearity considering
internal and external dependencies can become a
complex process in its own right.

Perceived Risk: Is the risk tangible and measurable for
the proposed action? Subjective risk assessment often
imposes negative influence on intangible actions.
Perceived Severity: Is a proposed action likely to lead to
near-term failure if it is not successful?
Perceived Efficacy: What is the likelihood that a
proposed action will achieve the desired objective?
Perceived Acceptance: Is there a consensus – implicit or
tacit – for taking proposed actions.
Perceived Self-Efficacy: Is a proposed action detrimental
to the decision-maker’s position, if taken.
Perceived Success Criteria: Is the definition of success
clear and understood by all actors? Is it measurable? Can
it be achieved? An assumption of success usually means
“everything goes right.” This measure may also involve
the degree to which a software project meets user
requirements that may not be stable. [19]
Perceived Usability: How do users perceive the usability
of delivered tools and their functionality? Tools that are
not easily usable will fall into disuse (as users find
workarounds).

Assessing Risk: Choosing the best metric(s) for risk
requires an understanding of the project domain. Risk
must be assessed within an understanding of domain
concepts and principles.
Experience: Before beginning a project, the organization
should have in-house experience in conducting software
projects of this type, technology, complexity, and
magnitude. Assessing the level of experience is difficult
due to the variability of individual’s skills.
Assessing complexity: Choosing metrics to measure
system/project complexity is difficult because there are
few agreed upon ways to assess complexity.
Assessing feasibility: Given a complexity metric, how do
we assess feasibility (potential for success)? In terms of
cost, schedule, functionality?
Availability: If rightly skilled personnel are not available,
can the project be completed by eliminating or replacing
the components demanding those skills?
Recovery and Remediation - 1: Does the management
team have the right skills to affect a recovery?
Recovery and Remediation – 2: Does the technical team
have the right skills to achieve recovery of the project?
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For AAS, both FAA and IBM significantly
underestimated the complexity and effort required to
design and test the real-time software to implement the
different subsystems. FAA did not have adequately
trained staff to review IBM’s software development
efforts. And, FAA did not have adequate metrics to
identify problems despite over 2,100 program trouble
reports filed by IBM as of March 1994, of which 800
were emergency or mission critical needing immediate
resolution. Such resolution was not forthcoming in a
timely manner. [7]

5.5 Factor Analysis
In [8], we proposed a framework for analysis
which identified three key factors; Schedule, cost, and
functionality (based on previous analysis by Rechtin
[20] for system architectures). Each of these factors
needs to be assessed. But we must understand that
these factors are interdependent and changes in one
area may have a nonlinear effect in other areas. These
factors are the determinants for potential for failure in
our proposed model described in section 6. The next
sections discuss issues for each of these factors.

5.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)
Every software project is undertaken to produce
some benefit, whether a service or capability. Every
project has costs in multiple categories associated with
it. A true cost analysis seeks to allocate all costs – both
direct and indirect – using monetary equivalents to
determine if a project is initially worthwhile doing
and, later, if it should be continued. A CBA seeks to
monetize the effects and/or achievements of a project
in order to compare them to the costs to determine if
there is a net positive return-on-investment (ROI).
Table 4 presents some challenges in performing CBA.

5.5.1 Schedule: Issues and Challenges
As noted, once a schedule has slipped, it is likely
to slip further. Rechtin [20] noted the time to complete
is proportional to the time spent. Many subfactors can
affect a project’s schedule. Caper Jones [21] has
addressed some of these noting the relationships
between higher software quality and shorter
development schedules.
Once you fall behind, you cannot catch up. In
complex projects with multiple subsystems, slippage
in one subsystem has interdependent impacts upon
other subsystems. Taken as a whole, overall slippage
may be accelerating due to these interdependencies.
Adding more personnel can rarely reduce slippage
due to increased team communications – a lesson
noted in the Mythical Man Month. Adding more
funding affects either labor hours or tools and
technology for developing technology. The downside
is that there is a delay in acquiring these items and
training may be required before their impact affects
the schedule. In any event, the best that can be
expected is to decrease the rate of schedule slippage.
Table 5 examines a few issues related to schedule.

Table 4. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)

Ex Ante CBA: Was an appropriately detailed CBA
performed to develop and justify the project’s budget?
Ex Post CBA: If the project has failed, has a summary
CBA been prepared to determine where cost overruns
have led to failure?
In Media Res CBA: If a project is failing, has a CBA been
performed at each milestone to assess whether financial
decisions are a cause of impending failure?
Dynamic CBA: IS CBA being performed on a periodic
basis to identify the impact of budget decisions on project
success?
Assessing Benefit: Benefit as a metric is project and
domain dependent. If tools or services are not being
delivered on time per schedule, then benefit degrades – a
possible sign of impending failure.
Decreasing CB Ratio: If the Cost-Benefit ratio is
decreasing, it is costing more to deliver the same benefit
– another possible sign of impending failure.

Depending on the success criteria, computing
CBA can vary in difficulty. A binary decision might
be delivery of tools and/or services per the schedule.
CBA then becomes an issue relative to budget – under,
on, or over – and by how much. Simple yes, but an
effective evaluation. The difficulty of computing CBA
increases as the success criteria become more
complex.

Table 5. Schedule Issues

Slippage Acceleration: If schedule slippage is
accelerating, are there actions to be taken that can arrest
such acceleration?
When is Done? Many projects are never done, unless
obsolescence or lack of funding do them in. Rather, there
are (almost) always new or changing requirements and/or
enhancements that can be made to any system. New or
changed requirements put pressure on the schedule and
may require schedule and cost recalibration.
Milestones: These are useful for assessing where you are
and deciding what to do next. Milestones are not
complete if work is unfinished. Marking milestones as
complete, and delivering partial documents or code
segments that cannot support downstream development
work is not how milestones are successfully applied. [21]
Falling Less Behind: Are there actions that can be taken
to recover some schedule slippage?
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Forward reallocation of functionality to future
milestones may allow some tasks to be performed
concurrently. Simplifying functionality may eliminate
dependencies that may yield opportunities for
concurrent development. Alternatively, cancellation
of functionality reduces milestones and deliverables
and, perhaps, necessitates rescheduling, but allows a
schedule catchup. Doing less, but doing it well may be
the solution to recovery [8].
As an example, FAA did not properly perform
oversight of complex subsystems which did not reveal
lack of progress and, when discovered, required
schedule delays to analyze the problems and
implement corrective actions [7].
5.5.2 Cost (funding): Issues and Challenges
Cost growth can arise due to many factors. Some
of these may be beyond the control of the project team;
these are exogeneous factors. Recognizing when they
occur and adjusting as quickly as possible may make
the pain and difficulty bearable.
In government (U.S.), funding is often
appropriated on an annual basis, with ~ eighteenmonth projects, but no assurance of allocation. You
know how much you ostensibly have for the coming
year but are not guaranteed to receive the same amount
or an increase in coming years. Knowing this allows
you to plan for deltas that may cause slippage in your
project and necessitate replanning.
Adhering to a budget is a hard process requiring
management stamina. Tracking expenditures requires
diligence. Once costs exceed the budget by some
percentage, which varies by project, hard decisions
need to be made and quickly. Like schedule slippage,
you can’t recover sunk money, only replan not to get
deeper in the red. Rechtin [20] noted that the failure
rate of a product is linearly proportional to its cost.
Table 6 presents some challenges related to cost.
Table 6. Some Cost Issues

Computing the cost estimate? If you don’t have one, how
did you prepare a budget? Putting the cart before the
horse is a recipe for failure.
Is the funding adequate? If not, what do you give up
(relax a constraint – cost, schedule, or functionality)? As
Rechtin [20] has noted, you can have two of these, but
not all three.
Contingency Funds: Is there a contingency fund for
unexpected costs? What percentage of the overall budget
is it?
Burn Rate: Is the labor burn rate exceeding that proposed
in the project budget? By how much? Is it accelerating?
Labor hours need to be tracked by skill category to
determine if they indicate problems. Other direct costs

also need to be tracked as unanticipated items can arise
quickly.
Cost Underruns: If costs in some categories are
underrunning the projected burn rate, this might indicate
that some work is not being accomplished due to other
problems.

As an example, the GAO noted that the
implementation plan, including cost and schedule
estimates, was overly ambitious given the highly
demanding requirements and. the complex software
architecture for this system. [7]
5.5.3 Functionality: Issues and Challenges
The key tasks of requirements analysis, system
design, system development, system testing, and
system deployment need to be practiced correctly and
reliably no matter which system development
methodology is used.
These tasks focus on assuring that the desired
functionality is implemented correctly and effectively.
From the validation and verification perspective, did
the team build the right functionality into the system
according to the requirements and is the functionality
built right according to accepted design and
development principles. Having a system architecture
is essential to success. Rechtin [20] observed that form
follows function. The system architecture provides
the road map to building the system.
Table 7 presents some challenges for
functionality.
Table 7. Functionality Challenges

Following the System Architecture: To slightly misquote
that famous American philosopher, Yogi Berra, if you
don’t know where you are going, no road will get you
there.
Is the Scope of the Project Feasible? If not, given cost
and schedule, what do you give up? The potential
problems of software functionality - stakeholder
mismatches, gold plating, inflexible solutions, and high
risk capabilities – require uncontrolled software projects
need stakeholder commitment to system objectives and
capabilities. [22]
Getting it Right: Deliver the right functionality at the
milestones. The key is to make it work, then make it work
faster! Or better! Or both!
Performance: Is not an afterthought! Set a performance
budget and try to hit it at each milestone. In the end,
performance substantially affects acceptance even if all
the functionality exists.

As an example in FAA’s AAS Project, the FAA
failed to make timely decisions about basic
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requirements (the electronic flight data strips) and
complex technology. [7]
5.6 Technology
All software projects rely on technology –
hardware and software – for implementation. Some
technologies are well-proven; some are bleeding edge.
Failure to assess the feasibility of applying technology
– whether selected or mandated – is a critical factor
because commitment to a technology may overwhelm
considerations of cost and schedule when it does not
succeed.
One critical challenge is selecting the right
technology. For example, if a component-based
software development approach is applied, it is
assumed that appropriate off-the-shelf components
can be assembled with a well-defined software
architecture. Component-based software technologies
have advantages, disadvantages, and inherited features
that may make excellent or very poor choices for a
specific software project. [23] Table 8 presents some
technology challenges.
Table 8. Technology: Issues and Challenges

Maturity: Is the technology proven (used in many
projects), but evolving, or relatively new? “Bleeding
edge” technology will significantly increase the
probability of failure.
Quantity: How many different technologies are in use
within a software project? Are any of them duplicative
and possible candidates for elimination?
Training: Is the development team adequately
(thoroughly) trained in how to use the technology?
Re-use: Has the technology been used on a previous
project, which (nearly) succeeded (albeit with some loss
of functionality)?
Integration: Are there conflicts between technologies
that preclude their integration in a project?

There is a strong tendency today to rely on open
source software (OSS) without understanding how it
works if one can understand the API. The premise is
that enough “eyeballs on” the software will detect and
correct flaws as they emerge through successive
evolutions of the software. Three key problems arise
with OSS are:
(1) Is the documentation adequate to explain how to
use the software properly?
(2) Is the software appropriate for the project, e.g., can
it be used without significant adaptation or
modification?
(3) Is the software up to date, e.g., has it been
improved, renovated, etc.?

We cannot explore these issues in this paper, but
they will be some of the critical variables in our
Proposed Model for assessing Software Project
Failure (Figure 1).
5.6.1 Tools
It has been suggested that we use the same tools
for forensic analysis that we use for software
development. We are not convinced that this is an
effective use of these tools because they are oriented
towards constructive analysis rather than discovery
and diagnostic analysis. We suggest that a new set of
tools for diagnostic analysis based on rule-based and
logic-based reasoning techniques would provide better
analytic capabilities.
A second class of tools is required to build a
model of a project and use it determine causes of
failure. Current project management tools are focused
on maintaining records of a project and the associated
housekeeping tasks. Rarely do they perform diagnosis
or analysis to detect potential causes of failure. Project
management artifacts are diverse, including
documents, databases, and automated programs. Even
simple tools in this area would be useful in the early
stages of forensic analysis.
We suggest a few issues and challenges
associated with forensic analysis tools in table 9.
Table 9. Tools

Discovery Tools: Automated tools are needed to discover
the architecture of the software system as-is, the
interrelationships between subsystems and modules, and
the attributes of these components.
Diagnostic Tools: These tools, containing models of
failure in software, would analyze the structure of
software systems to identify potential causes of failure
(see Root Cause Analysis).
Project Models: Many projects, consciously or not,
adhere to a few project architypes. Developing models of
projects with flexible syntax will be essential to the
development of project discovery tools.
Project Discovery Tools: Like software discovery tools,
there is a need for tools to examine and analyze project
artifact to build a model for diagnose, analyze, and report.
Project Diagnostic Tools: Like software diagnostic tools,
there is a need for tools to diagnose, analyze, and report
on potential causes of project failure.
Practices are Tools Too: Choosing the right processes
and practices can make or break a project. One cannot
simply assume that Agile or life cycle processes are
appropriate. Processes can focus on specific issues such
as security vulnerabilities. For example, specification
languages, and security requirements engineering
processes may be more or less appropriate for a system
with critical security requirements because of the
properties of such languages. [24]
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We note that discovery and diagnostic tools will
have to be developed for individual programming
languages to “recognize and understand” their syntax
and semantics. Such tools would also require models
of patterns expressible in those languages. The full
suite of tools selected needs to provide overlapping,
but necessarily reinforcing views of the work in
context. Model storming – the practice of using the
learning from one model, view, or viewpoint, to
update another, is a critical element to avoid or resolve
project issues. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
enumerate discovery and diagnostic tools and their
features and attributes.
6. Model
Today, project recovery is becoming a
disciplined, focused, collaborative effort. Determining
if recovery is possible requires identifying, and
measuring the effect of, the causes of the failure and
choosing off-setting processes and actions that the
available resources may use to facilitate recovery. To
this end, we propose an initial model to begin
developing a quantitative assessment of the
probability of recovery. It is critical to develop a
research-based understanding of how the data
collected in a forensic analysis can be assembled and
used to assess the failure of a project. When the
determination is completed, one can realistically
decide whether to attempt recovery (with some
expectation of success) or cut one’s losses.
Our proposed model (Figure 1) projects how data
collected during the forensic analysis is related. Our
research recommendations describe how this model
can be analyzed with data drawn from failed projects.
Our model is based on a framework derived from an
initial analysis of factors affecting software project
failure [8].
The Model is organized into four levels: Sample
Variables, Context, Factors, and Outcome.
Sample Variables suggests some of the things that
we will measure – either quantitatively or qualitatively
– in this research effort. We will identify a set of
variables based on a literature search and review.
There are both direct costs and indirect costs. Direct
costs can be quantitatively assessed. Indirect costs,
such as the effect of poor personnel infrastructure on
the performance of developer teams will have to be
qualitatively assessed. Another variable might be the
existence and/or availability of appropriate tools for
ongoing assessment of a project.

Context captures the areas of decision-making
within a project. Poor decisions are the key to software
project failure. [8] Decisions are based on data or lack
thereof by personnel associated with the project. But,
decision-making uses procedures, rules, heuristics, or
“gut instinct” which often can only be qualitatively
assessed. Thus, the measured variables must be
aggregated into proxy variables that influence the
factors.
Factors represent an aggregation of the Context
variables into critical elements that will define whether
a software project is failing or has failed. As noted in
[8], if a software project is behind schedule at a certain
point, and continues to fall further behind, the
likelihood of recovery according to the original project
plan has a decreasing probability. Because the three
factors are interdependent, no single equation will
generate a definite probability. Rather, we hope to
identify a probability range and a set of rules for
deciding whether a software project will fail or not.
The probability range and the set of rules will
constitute the Outcome of the model.
We recognize the significant difficulties with the
advanced techniques that can be used to ascribe
causation to the failure of a software project. A
recommended research approach would stress the use
of converging results from multiple causal analysis
methods such as: causal diagrams; flow-graphs (nodes
representing project events, with points interconnected
a set of linear algebraic equation); statistics; analysis
among variables; and causation parameters. [25]
Our methodology and collection techniques for
sets of data from multiple projects would address each
detected (root cause analysis) cause of failure. We then
suggest classification by type, process area, and
observed interconnectedness to other causes. Analysis
will then be undertaken of type, process area, and
interconnectedness. It will be challenging to find
cooperating failed projects (organizations do not brag
about or publish such data), but we suggest that a
sample (size dependent upon research resources) be
subjected to these analyses. We believe qualitative
analysis will then be possible (and necessary) from a
critical assessment of the common denominators for
the causal relationships among the processes in the
project’s areas.
7. Conclusion
Our major theme in this paper is that forensic
analysis is essential to understanding how and why
software projects fail. To achieve that understanding,
we must determine the what, when, and where of
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events that led to decisions causing the impending
failure. This paper has defined forensic analysis for
failing software projects and examined techniques,
tools, and methods for determining how and why
software projects can fail, and to suggest some
mitigating actions to recover from potential failure.
We emphasize that recovery from potential
failure does not mean that the project will eventually
succeed as envisioned in the original project plan, but
that the project will be able to deliver a functional
capability within a revised schedule and budget that is
some subset of the original project plan. Our
conclusions are presented in the following table.
Table 10. Conclusions

Project recovery as an activity is substantially different
from project management but may be thought of as a subdiscipline. Our research will elucidate the differences as
a basis for future training.
Project failures (and substantive data): Data are sparse.
Current analytics lack rigor in the analysis of the
determinants of failure.
Project Complexity: The effects of decisions in different
project components and software areas can lead to
nonlinear effects that may result in emergent behavior as
Midha [26] discussed. Software developers can expect
surprises.
Research Model: While the proposed model is a start,
future work will refine the number of variables, better
elucidate the context, and develop the relationships
between the three factors
Research Techniques: are understood and available, but
infrequently discussed in the literature (wisdom, or
academic).
Research Progress has had a questionable (perhaps
limited) impact on reducing project failures and project
success.

8. Recommendations
Our conclusions indicate there is much work to be done
in this area to develop practices, standards, and a cadre of
trained
forensic
analysts.
We
present
some
recommendations in the following table.
Table 11. Recommendations for Future Research
A Body of Knowledge (BOK) should be developed for
Forensic Analysis of Software Projects.
A Forensic Analyst should be an integral part of every
major software project. S/he should report to the Project
Manager, but also, have a conduit to the sponsors.
Forensic analysis of software projects should be an
integral part of project management and reported in
periodic reviews, including major milestones.
New Forensic Metrics Development: Jones [27] notes the
problem of existing metrics. We suggest the need for
new, explicit metrics for forensic analysis.
A Certification Program should be developed to train
forensic analysts according to the Body of Knowledge.

Academics: To further research in this critical area, an
MS/Ph.D. program should be developed in Forensic
Analysis for Software Projects.
A training program should be developed for software
engineers, program managers, and other team members
in the basic of forensic analysis.
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